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‘Live’, or novel, metaphors continue to occupy an interesting space in both the 
philosophical and cognitive sphere. One metaphorical theory, offered by 
French philosopher Paul Ricœur, is thoroughly fleshed out in relation to other 
dominant linguistic accounts of metaphor. Ricœur’s theory is 
underrepresented in much of contemporary neurolinguistic literature even 
though it bears great resemblance to many features of modern theories in 
cognitive science; as such, the current article attempts to establish a clear 
connection between Ricœur’s work and the cognitive sciences without 
collapsing into ‘psychological associationism’. The present article offers this 
connection to re-establish the value of philosophy and hermeneutics to the 
scientific enterprise by embracing interdisciplinary study. 
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Live metaphors continue to occupy an interesting space 
in both the philosophical and cognitive sphere. The progression 
of philosophical thought on the matter can be understood as 
residing in one of three distinct layers of theoretical inquiry, of 
which I will call, in descending order, 1) “semantic operation”, 
2) “scope of meaning”, and 3) “solution type”. One metaphorical 
theory, presented by French philosopher Paul Ricœur, will be 
followed through each layer, as the theory bears great 
resemblance to modern theories in cognitive science, but 
requires explication to establish the connection. As such, this 
article intends to draw, and flesh out, parallels between 
Ricœur’s exploration of metaphor as either predication or 
naming on the one end and recent advances in the cognitive 
sciences on the other; this is in an effort to characterize the 
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extra-linguistic realism found in the tensional aspects of live 
metaphors and give incite to the cognition of language. I will go 
on to show that this parallelism is distinct from the 
‘psychological associationism’ that Ricœur critiques, but rather 
addresses the “boundary between semantic theory of metaphor 
and a psychological theory of imagination and feeling” (Ricœur 
1978, 143).1  
 
1. Linguistic Traditions of Metaphor 
When considering what metaphor is, one ought to 
distinguish between two basic semantic operations a given 
assertion can take on: the lexical and figurative. Purely lexical 
accounts, typically called ‘brute-force’ or lexical substitution 
accounts, hold that there is nothing being said beyond the 
literal sense of the words present. On these views, when one 
says “their smile is a fine wine”, she is uttering a false 
assertion–a smile is not fine wine in an ordinary sense. These 
views typically take metaphor to operate similarly to a dream 
or that of a work of art, where seeming resemblances between 
terms allows for the substitution of one word in for another to 
produce a clearer understanding. As Moran puts it, this 
substitution “frames” some literal, primary word with some 
other secondary word through juxtaposition; this drives one to 
see the framed word in a new way, though in a way already 
contained within the word itself. The framing forces a listener 
to mentally paraphrase anew what is intended in the lexical 
content.2 In essence, metaphor merely produces a rhetorical or 
decorative effect. 
Contrary to these accounts are those who believe that 
something new is being said with metaphorical content. More 
specifically, such content is not explicitly expressed through the 
lexical content of a sentence, but rather at some non-lexical 
level. Like substitution accounts, resemblance still plays a 
crucial role in the meaning of the metaphor. For Ricœur, 
“resemblance is no less required in a tension theory, for the 
semantic innovation through which a previously unnoticed 
‘proximity’ of two ideas is perceived despite their logical 
distance must in fact be related to the work of resemblance” 





(Ricœur 2004, 4). The difference remains that those 
resemblances operate outside of constrained lexicality. 
While providing an argument for either side of this 
dichotomy is beyond the scope of this paper, Ricœur naturally 
finds himself in the non-lexical camp in terms of what drives the 
creation of metaphorical content, as he thinks it is a mistake to 
concede that “words have a permanent meaning by which they 
designate some referents and not others” like the semanticist or 
structuralist believes (Ricœur 2004, 130). As such, “let us call 
any ‘shift from literal to figurative sense’ a metaphor...any lexical 
value whatsoever is a literal meaning; thus, the metaphorical 
meaning is non-lexical: it is a value created by the context” 
(Ricœur 2004, 188). This non-lexical value is the ‘figure’ of one’s 
speech. Now situated within the realm of non-lexical accounts, 
we are pushed into the second layer of inquiry to understand the 
scope of the newly created meaning.  
There are two main approaches3 one might have about 
the scope within which the metaphorical content can be found: 
at the level of the word, word-metaphor, or at the level of the 
sentence, sentence-metaphor. Metaphorical content at the level 
of the word does not mean that meaning needs to collapse 
merely into lexical content. Rather, the content is produced via 
the basic procession of words presented in a sentence latching 
on to “the framework of a semiotics for which all the units of 
language are varieties of the sign”, which is reference to those 
that believe in the homogeneity of words as signifiers (Ricœur 
2004, 158). As such, in this view sentences are merely derived 
from lexemes, while metaphorical meaning is contingent on the 
severity of deviant denomination (i.e., how strange the 
substitution of one word in for another is). The difficulty4 for 
many of these formulations is that “one really has to return to 
contextual uses to define the diverse acceptations of one and 
the same word, whether they be usual or unusual acceptations; 
so these [words] are actually nothing but the contextual 
variations that can be classed according to their families of 
occurrence” (Ricœur 2004, 145). In short, accounts that have 
this character appear to privilege the status of a word as having 
metaphorical content, even though that content is being created 
at the level or structure of the sentence. 
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This points to the other approach that is the sentence-
metaphor, which is offered by Max Black and related thinkers. 
Black’s interactionist theory, for our purposes, is the clearest. 
As he writes in his landmark text Models and Metaphor, “when  
we  use  a  metaphor we have two thoughts of different things 
active together and supported by a single word or phrase, 
whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction” (Black 1962, 
38). This interaction arises from the ‘focus’ and the ‘frame’, 
where the focus is the word or phrase being used 
metaphorically, whereas the rest of the literal sentence is the 
frame which props-up the metaphorical content; this, again, is 
in direct contrast of one word replacing another for what is 
driving metaphor, with the rest of the sentence being neutral in 
the act. Ricœur believes that such theories can more adequately 
address difficulties raised by thinkers like Donald Davidson, 
who generally push back on the possibility of any meaning 
beyond predicate logic within semantics.5  
Here, we see Ricœur shifting away from a linguistics of 
language to a linguistics of discourse–a distinction borrowed 
from linguist and philosopher Émile Benveniste. A linguistics of 
language, which centers around a sign as the linguistic basic 
unit (i.e., semiology), quickly collapses back into what Ricœur 
calls the “new rhetoric”–what essentially led directly to the 
aforementioned “brute-force” accounts of metaphor. A linguistics 
of discourse, which uses “the sentence [as] the basic unit of 
discourse”, allows for the introduction of cognition into language 
(Ricœur 1973, 92); in particular, it allows for a speaker and 
meta-realistic6 imagination to enter into the sphere of meaning. 
In this way, a linguistics of discourse can be thought to absorb 
some of the components of semiology, while still pushing beyond 
the formal system of signs. As such, metaphorical content exists 
in the form or space of a ‘tensional’ event between the order of 
language and an always new situation of cognitive (imaginative) 
context experienced by the audience. For the order of language, 
the ‘tension’ is the impertinent predication of two typically 
unrelated words or concepts in the context of a sentence or 
extended discourse. For the cognitive context, the ‘tension’ 
results from a previously unformed association between concepts 
in reality, driven by an uncomfortable confusion or enigma based 





proportionally on the logical distance between two concepts. This 
pushes Ricœur into the third level of analysis, where he 
challenges how metaphor is understood or ‘solved’, as he claims 
theories like Black’s do not solve the problem of  “innovation” of 
meaning beyond the structure of a logical subject and predicate–
though more on this in a moment.  
Thus far we have investigated briefly the range of 
metaphorical theories and their most basic differences. It is 
here where I want to flesh out what Ricœur is actually 
proposing in his ‘tensional’ theory. In the most basic sense, 
Ricœur wants to draw a distinction between live metaphors and 
dead metaphors. In short:  
there are no metaphors in the dictionary; even though polysemy is 
lexicalized, metaphor, at least newly created metaphor, is not; and 
when it does become lexicalized, it means that the metaphor in 
common use has become part of polysemy. (Ricœur 2004, 190) 
 In offering his theory, he is trying to avoid the 
consideration of phrases like “the hands of the clock” or the 
“body of an essay” which, due to popular use or common 
understanding, have been collapsed into a purely lexical status 
for meaning. The “hands of a clock”, while metaphorical 
properly speaking, does not pick out the semantic twist Ricœur 
is after. Once the phrase entered common use for a given agent, 
there became no logical distance to produce “a sensed deviation” 
where one word was filled with a new meaning (Ricœur 2004, 
190). Rather, a phrase in common use picks out in the 
imagination exactly what the meaning was intended to, just as 
“hands of a person” picks out what the speaker intended to 
without any newly created meaning.  
When a novel metaphor is presented, it offers a paradox 
of meaning in the ‘figure’ of the speech. We are confronted with 
something being, and not being, the case (e.g., “Prithvi is a 
porcupine” asserts that Pirthvi is a porcupine, though we know 
it is, of course, not the case). Ricœur holds that something new 
is being said, as it is not merely that one is drawing a 
connection between two things that are logically distant and 
calling attention to that deviation. Rather, the speaker, “from 
an inconsistent utterance for a literal interpretation, draws a 
significant utterance for a new interpretation which deserves to 
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be called metaphorical because it generates the metaphor not 
only as deviant but as acceptable” (Ricœur 1978, 146). When 
considering resemblance establishing a new predicative 
meaning, which is akin to quantifying over more basic 
predicates, cognitive imagination is required. Often, 
imagination is mistaken as a process that happens after 
semantic prediction occurs instead of being “immanent” to the 
prediction itself; this takes form through several mechanisms. 
The first step, Ricœur says, is seeing A as B, which is the 
restructuring of semantic fields, while “still homogeneous to 
discourse itself”, via establishing a direct connection between 
distant logical categories (Ricœur 1978, 147). The connection is 
not one-to-one, but rather understanding the set of combinatory 
possibilities, both in scope and proportionality, between A and 
B. Ricœur calls this predicative assimilation, which is distinct 
from psychological associationism, in that, it is not merely that 
a speaker is noticing associated characteristics, but rather 
ascribing or making A and B similar through semantic 
proximity. Putting this in context of Black’s aforementioned 
theory, the first dimension is to understand the contextual 
scope of the focus-frame set up. 
This leads to what Ricœur describes as the pictorial 
dimension of metaphor, which shows “the way in which a 
semantic innovation is not only schematized but pictured” 
(Ricœur 1978, 149). To be clear, this is merely a quasi-optic 
dimension and is not some remnant of faded sense impressions 
discussed by those like David Hume. Rather,  
[t]o imagine...is not to have a mental picture of something but to 
display relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction 
concerns unsaid and unheard similarities or refers to qualities, 
structures, localizations, situations, attitudes, or feelings, each time 
the new intended connection is grasped as what the icon describes or 
depicts (Ricœur 1978, 150). 
This is the operation of imagination and meaning that 
extends to touch the edge of psychology, the realm that has 
been deemed semantically irrelevant by the classic Frege sense-
representation distinction. The theory at hand does not extend 
into psychology, but rests on the edge of semantics and 
psychology by focusing on “association” of concepts in reality 





grounded in linguistic convention. This is because the pictorial 
dimension is generated and controlled exclusively by 
schematization. The ‘control’ is the third step where meaning 
undergoes a “suspension”, or negative phase, where the 
ultimate effect of the peripheral subject on the primary subject 
is realized. This is to say the metaphor’s meaning is ‘solved’ via 
what Frege calls “sense”; the referent is not something that 
physically exists, but rather a potentiality of a given state of 
affairs and properly expands what characterizes a referent. In 
Ricœur’s words,  
“the possibility that metaphorical discourse says something about 
reality collides with the apparent constitution of poetic discourse, 
which seems to be essentially non-referential and centered on itself. 
To this non-referential conception of poetic discourse I oppose the 
idea that the suspension of literal reference is the condition for the 
release of a power of second-degree reference, which is properly 
poetic reference. Thus, to use an expression borrowed from Jakobson, 
one must not speak only of split sense but of ‘split reference’ as well” 
(Ricœur 2004, 5, emphasis added) 
This power of second-degree reference is not as far-
fetched and decorative as many make it out to be, as it is at not 
only the conceptual core of much of science, but is absorbed 
directly into theory itself. For instance, Albert Einstein’s 
famous text The Foundation of The General Theory of Relativity 
does not mention curvature, the fabric of spacetime, or any 
other metaphor of the sort. He presents his theory in 
mathematical language that is clear within the realm of 
ordinary calculus. This is drastically different from how we 
describe relativity today in a proper scientific concept, 
particularly in that scientists are trained to not think of gravity 
“like” curvature, but rather there is curvature when Rρσμυ  is 
not zero; such curvature is gravity, which is what physicist 
Sean Carroll offers in his 2004 textbook Spacetime and 
Geometry in his chapter on Curvature. In short, the metaphor 
has become part of theories in physics–theories that are 
falsifiable, even though the metaphor was linguistically prior to 
these observations and the metaphor was made up in 
popularized science to make the theory understandable. 
To reiterate in regard to reference, “to ask about what a 
metaphorical statement is, is something other and something 
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more than to ask what it says” and what it says is to project 
“new possibilities of redescribing the world” (Ricœur 1978, 152; 
154). This is not to say that metaphor and “poetic language is 
no less about reality than any other use of language but refers 
to it by the means of a complex strategy which implies, as an 
essential component, a suspension and seemingly an abolition 
of the ordinary reference attached to descriptive language” 
(Ricœur 1978, 153). As such, metaphorical language is 
ambiguous, allowing for the expansion of ordinary descriptive 
language. Metaphors can be “solved” for meaning, insofar as 
imagination creates a fiction to be considered and ascribed to 
reality, but there is no single meaning that can be deduced–
only constrained potentialities.  
Ricœur’s theory of metaphor seriously undercuts the 
continental structuralist project and potentially provides a clear 
counterexample to positivists like Rudolf Carnap. Metaphor, in 
Ricœur’s view, is a phenomenon that has properties that can 
escape a semantic formal system (e.g., it is an instance of a 
meaningful ‘external’ statement to Carnap’s internal-external 
distinction) while still being guarded from subjectivism or 
relativism through a clear semantic grounding. Most 
interestingly, there is a growing body of theory and evidence 
from the cognitive sciences providing empirical support for 
metaphor as being “tensional” in character. 
 
2. Cognition and Metaphor 
In a broad sense, one’s actions in the world are based on 
her cognitive structure. A cognitive structure is merely a 
construct that “provides meaning and organization to 
experiences and guides both the processing of new information 
and the retrieval of stored information” (Seel 2012a, 619). This 
structure is constituted by schema and mental models, which 
draw on cognizable and non-cognizable phenomena (e.g., 
memory processes and mechanistic movement patterns, 
respectively). A schema (i.e., ‘shape’ or ‘plan’) is the abstract or 
generic knowledge one acquires through their individual 
experiences with “objects, people, situations, and events” (Seel 
2012c, 2933). This is essentially the permanent scope of 





assumptions one continually builds and revamps through time, 
but doesn’t necessarily question at every, or any, given moment. 
Items making the core of a schema could be the effects of 
gravity on your body and how you move through space, the 
feeling of air rushing through your nose as you breathe, and so 
forth. These components can change in how they are assumed 
and inform experience in one’s life (e.g., if one becomes 
paralyzed from the waist down, her body will feel drastically 
different and will alter that person’s standard kinesthetic 
sense). Typically, though, a schema is not being constantly 
collapsed and restructured during each chronological 
experience, but rather is restructured at a higher logical level 
through the interaction and interpretation of those 
chronological experiences. Think of this as information that 
generalizes to what “tends to be the case” loosely speaking. 
Fitting within a schema are mental models. Mental 
models are “internal representations containing meaningful 
declarative and procedural knowledge that people use to 
understand specific phenomena” (Al-Diban 2012, 2200). Both 
theorists and scientists tend to use mental models to notate the 
process of practical rationalization of momentary events, where 
new information is processed in relation to schema. In particular, 
“in order to create situation-specific plausibility, one individual 
constructs a model that integrates the relevant semantic 
knowledge and meets the requirements of the situation to be 
mastered…[via] perception, imagination and knowledge, and the 
comprehension of discourse” (Al-Diban 2012, 2200). 
When acting as an agent in the world, our 
understanding, decisions, experience, and general discourse are 
reliant on how well the information we receive fits our schema. 
Otherwise, there is no basis to even begin to create an 
understanding of what is happening. Returning to metaphor, 
consider m1, “Prithvi is a porcupine”, m2, “Prithvi est un porc-
épic”, and m3, “プリスヴィはヤマアラシです”, where each is a 
lexical translation of m1 into French and Katakana (Japanese), 
respectively. For people in the English-speaking world, given 
that Prithvi is a person, m1 fits partially within their schema: 
m1 is in a language they understand with conventional syntax. 
What is being said or semantically communicated is a puzzle 
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that does not exactly fit with their typical schema, as the literal 
interpretation is logically absurd or associately novel; two 
familiar things that do not normally go together calls for a 
mental model that draws from one’s “perception, imagination[,] 
and knowledge” coupled with “relevant semantics” to create a 
new meaning. In short, the prediction of a live metaphor, 
perhaps examples more novel than those I have offered, 
delivers information to a listener that is to be understood but 
creates confusion (i.e., metaphorical tension). 
 
3. The untranslatability of “Working” Metaphorical 
Solutions 
One curious aspect of Ricœur’s theory is that 
metaphorical meaning has “untranslatable information” 
(Ricœur 1978, 143). Given the basic components of mental 
models, it is clear to see why. Consider the relationship 
between m1 and m2, and m1 and m3. These are both proper 
translations of the original sentence lexically, both into a 
language with linguistic tones, French, and one without, 
Japanese. In this sense, they are clearly translatable in a brute-
lexical way, but not in the way that is relevant to one’s 
understanding of meaning.  
Given our move beyond the lexical, it is natural to then 
point to the difficulty at hand being described not via the 
transfer of lexical structure across languages, but rather 
between speakers and their respective prototypical 
associations. In this view, a sentence has some meaning (i.e., 
purely lexical), in virtue of its structure alone, but metaphor 
moves proper or ‘charitable’ meaning to the edge of the 
semantic and cognitive. We cannot assume that our interlocutor 
is saying something absurd when asserting something lexically 
false, so we invoke the Principle of Charity7, which requires 
that we interpret our interlocutor to be saying what we take to 
be the most rational sentence, perhaps by paraphrasing their 
intended meaning in some long-form discourse or description.  
Continuing with such an account, what we could see as a 
difference between each set of lexical translations between m1 
and m2, and m1 and m3 is that a “porcupine” serves as a different 





prototype in the geographical regions each language is typically 
spoken. A prototype is the “most typical or representative 
member of a category”, but “none of [the prototypes are] 
necessary or sufficient for category membership” (Seel 2012b, 
2714). Applied to language, a prototype is the most proper 
meaning of a word (i.e., something found in a dictionary), but it 
is not necessary or sufficient for this entire meaning to be 
contained within a deviant usage. In the porcupine case, there 
are Hystricidae and Erethizontidae porcupines (i.e., old world 
‘OW’ and new world ‘NW’ porcupines, respectively). OW 
porcupines are from southern Europe, Asia, and most of Africa, 
whereas NW porcupines are only in north and south America. 
OW porcupines are known to be very large and exclusively 
nocturnal, whereas NW porcupines are much smaller and can 
be seen roaming around either during day or night. Most people 
in the respective schema might have one assumption over the 
other, if any at all, but it is solely based on the individual’s 
accumulation of knowledge and basic assumptions over time 
and is not contained in the word porcupine properly. 
As I intend to show, metaphorical meaning goes much 
deeper than just the aforementioned “prototypical member of a 
category” account. Rather, it draws on how categories (i.e., 
components of a cognitive schema) are related and evoked 
during the use of a metaphor. Ricœur, and related thinkers, 
still hold that metaphor is on the edge of the semantic and 
cognitive, but they push back on the cause of untranslatability 
being a difference in signs or prototypic alterations. In 
particular, “the metaphor is more than a mere substitution for 
another literal word which an exhausting paraphrase could 
restitute at the same place” for, if this was the case, nothing 
new would be said (Ricœur 1974, 101). The untranslatability 
comes from, in Black’s words, “interaction-metaphors [being] 
not expandable ... this use of a subsidiary subject to foster 
insight into a principal subject is a distinctive intellectual 
operation”; in other words, metaphor cannot be translated via 
traditional semantics without “a loss in cognitive content” 
(Black 1962, 46). Regardless of exactly what the person saying 
the metaphor meant or what the listener interpreted, the 
metaphor itself does not have one and the same meaning from 
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either  of the interpreters, nor one in the same meaning each 
time a speaker considers the metaphor them self–though more 
on that in a moment. The metaphor is ambiguous, as each 
person is only trying to approach their interlocutor in 
understanding without ever quite getting there. As such, 
mistranslations occur irrespective of the language used and 
happen all the time within the very same language; that is to 
say the closer one’s schema is to another, the closer the 
approximation of meanings without actual equivalence.8 
For instance, suppose I turn to my friend Tugi and say 
“Prithvi is a porcupine”, with Prithvi being someone we are 
both close to and have similar shared experiences with since we 
met him at roughly the same time. Tugi’s response will 
undoubtedly be one of momentary confusion followed by an 
extension to the discourse. He might affirm that my assertion is 
true or might say, to the contrary, “Prithvi is more of a(n) ①”, 
where ① is some framing predicate. This signals a sense of 
created understanding. Tugi would not say that “Prithvi”, 
which quantifies over a certain set of logical predicates, and 
“porcupine”, which quantifies over a different set of logical 
predicates, perhaps with some overlap, are not numerically or 
qualitatively identical and therefore the assertion is false. We 
are charitable beings. Tugi would try to resolve the ambiguous 
puzzle by drawing on the semantic context I have provided and 
the imagination and knowledge (i.e., context) he is bringing to 
the discourse. He would not leave the conversation with the 
charge of me being absurd, but would try to translate what I 
have said to him into something he can understand as best he 
can. We do not have to be completely certain via a perfect 
logical translation to understand what is being said, just as we 
do not have to have logical certainty from scientific induction to 
be sure that the chair beneath me will not collapse the next 
time I sit on it.  
The difficulty consistency of meaning for a metaphor at 
some time t1 and a later time t2 comes from the categories being 
engaged in the discourse. When we offer something like 
“Prithvi” and “porcupine”, we are not merely referencing two 
specific beings, but also evoking meta-categories that ascribe 
properties to those subcategories implicitly, with “meta-





categories” being inter-related abstractions of a higher logical 
formed from experience. For instance, Prithvi not only refers to 
a man, but men more generally, the human animal, and so 
forth. If, given the proper context, Prithvi as a man could also 
get at more distant and abstract categories like mortality, 
fallibility, humility, fragility, and so forth. Similarly, 
porcupines could draw from categories like rodent, animal, or 
the wilderness. In a more distant and abstract way, it could get 
at purity, bravery, innocence, love, and so forth. When a live, or 
novel, metaphor is presented, all of those abstract and non-
abstract categories are potentialities of meaning that could 
interact and drive forward some potential ‘solution’ to the 
metaphorical puzzle. What we see in the transition from live to 
dead metaphors is merely that we are closing out the higher-
order logical categories and assume a pre-established 
connection. Why would we do this? Language is a pragmatic 
enterprise–we need to kill metaphors. If for every conversation 
we needed to pull in essentially infinite context by going up into 
a higher predicate level, you wouldn’t be able to act. For 
instance, if I use the metaphor “I spent time at work today”, we 
just assume that I went to work today and not that I ‘withdrew’ 
from some bank-account containing the hours of my life, or that 
my time is a type of spendable currency, or that work is 
transactional, or anything of the sorts. Such interpretations in 
meaning are possible, but would not traditionally be pointed at 
for pragmatic reasons. Further, this picture shows that the live 
and dead metaphor distinction is not a binary criterion, but 
moves in a gradient or in degrees. 
 
4. Cognitive and Semantic Confusion: a Split-tension 
What needs to be emphasized is that the aforementioned 
“confusion” that Tugi feels when I give a cryptic metaphor is 
the cognitive-side of tension for Ricœur, which goes hand-in-
hand with impertinent predication (semantic tension) at the 
level of language. The more bizarre or logically distant two 
concepts are from each other, the more tension the receiver of a 
metaphor undergoes. We are meaningful beings and, to some 
degree, narrative-based beings; when we engage in 
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conversation, listen to discourse, or interact with a text, we 
struggle to make sense of language in order to make sense of 
another. There are two clear driving forces in this area. The 
first is that to understand another is to have social capital, in 
that, it is a useful behavior for survival.9 On the other hand, 
there is an actual discomfort that linguistic confusion causes 
when we do not understand (i.e., the discomfort and intrigue of 
an enigma). For Ricœur, “the tension and contradiction [of 
metaphor] point only to the form of the problem within the 
enigma, what one could call the semantic challenge or, in Jean 
Cohen’s terms, the ‘semantic impertinence’” (Ricœur 2004, 229). 
In other words, we attempt to understand the enigma or 
semantic challenge put in front of us.  
Through this attempted understanding, we are making 
two things that are dissimilar, similar by establishing new 
connections between distant ideas (i.e., redescribing reality in a 
new way). These new connections are initially in only a mental 
model and, if too dissimilar to our schema, we can either fully 
reject the metaphor or omit its meaning altogether. On the 
other hand, if the metaphor is not strange enough (i.e., their 
resemblance has died or collapsed into polysemy), no twist in 
meaning happens at all. When the association is finally made 
between dissimilar ideas, we can feel a rush of pleasure as we 
have a working definition of meaning. What is important to 
note is that, as mentioned before, to make this association does 
not mean the resolution is the meaning of the metaphor, it is 
merely what the meaning is taken to be.  
The tension caused by trying to associate two drastically 
dissimilar ideas is something we see some evidence for in the 
cognitive sciences. When literal sentences, conventional 
metaphors, and novel metaphors are compared, there are 
degrees to the amount of the brain that is activated and where 
that activation occurs. Take the following study results. 
Conventional metaphors show slightly more activation in the 
right inferior temporal gyrus compared to the literal condition; 
anomalous (novel) metaphors compared to the literal shows 
much greater activation bilaterally in the frontal and temporal 
gyri; anomalous metaphor compared to conventional metaphor 
“shows bilateral activation in the middle frontal gyrus and the 





precentral gyrus, and right-hemisphere activation in the 
superior frontal gyrus” (Ahrens et al. 2007). For context: 
The left hemisphere activation in the frontal and temporal gyri point 
to the recruitment of traditional language-based areas for anomalous 
metaphor sentences, while the right-hemisphere activation found 
suggests that remote associations are being formed (Ahrens et al. 
2007). 
While it is important in cognitive science, and 
neuroscience for that matter, to never overstate the 
interpretation of fMRI results–particularly to say that certain 
activation really points to a specific, clearly defined behavioral 
meaning–I reference this study and allude to many others like 
it because we empirically see that there is something 
qualitatively and quantitatively different about novel 
metaphors compared to everyday language use. This result 
drastically contrasts many accounts that discount metaphor as 
being integral to the study of language. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As the cognitive sciences continue to develop and draw 
on philosophy for theoretical and normative guidance, I 
attempted to show that Paul Ricœur’s conception of metaphor 
provides critical insights to the nature of language that might 
aid in that enterprise. There is still much work to do regarding 
what drives the difference between novel metaphors and 
standard language. I have tried to show that the tensional 
aspect of metaphor appears to play an important role in 
understanding meaning in discourse and that such tension 
challenges us to push beyond constrained formalistic systems 
of language, especially as it relates to the cognitive sciences. 
This account also raises questions in the field of education–
particularly when considering the parallels between “killing” a 
metaphor and what we tend to think of as “learned 
knowledge”. At the very least, the connection between 
Ricœur’s metaphorical theory and cognition shows that many 
dominant understandings of language are almost certainly 
incomplete. 
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4 See study four “Metaphor and the semantics of the word” in (Ricœur 2004) 
for full critique. 
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regarding the status of meaning for sentence-metaphor. 
6 By “meta-realistic imagination”, I refer to the idea that we can imagine real 
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doing so, we can alter our immediate understanding of reality as it relates to 
linguistics. This is essentially deviant predication, where to say X is Y is to 
produce a dialectical between one’s prototypical understanding of X and of Y. 
This can create a new understanding that comes from the tension of “(X and 
Y) and (X and not Y)”. 
7 “We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we 
interpret in a way that optimises agreement” (Davidson 1973, 19). 
8 While the non-translatability of metaphorical language faces sharp 
criticisms from thinkers both in and out of the continental tradition, a full 
reconstruction of Ricœur’s argument is beyond the scope of this paper. See 
(Davidson 1973), (Quine 1969) for examples of criticisms of untranslatability 
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relativism. 
9 I am not alluding to any form of naturalized epistemology like W.V.O Quine 
or the “Darwinian Dilemma” offered by Sharon Street. I am merely stating 
that, in terms of social beings operating in everyday hierarchies, 
communication makes it easier to live a prolonged life, whether it is for 
prevention of mental illness, access to resources, or procreation (i.e., avoiding 
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